The Civil War's Tragic Legacy
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The Civil War produced at least two important outcomes.
First, although it was not President Lincoln's intent, it freed slaves in the Confederate States.
Second, it settled, through the force of arms, the question of whether states could secede from the Union. The causes of and the issues surrounding America's most costly war, in terms of battlefield casualties, are still controversial.
Whether one's sentiments lie with the Confederacy or with the Union, a more accurate characterization of the war is that it was a war for southern independence; a frequently heard southern reference is that it was the War of Northern Aggression.
History books most often say the war was fought to free the slaves. But that idea is brought into serious question considering what Abraham Lincoln had to say in his typical speeches:
"I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so."
Slavery makes for great moral cause celebre for the War Between the States but the real causes had more to do with problems similar to those the nation faces today - a federal government that has escaped the limits the Framers of the Constitution envisioned.
South Carolina Senator John C Calhoun expressed that concern in his famous Fort Hill Address July 26, 1831, at a time when he was Andrew Jackson's vice-president.
Calhoun said, "Stripped of all its covering, the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or consolidated government; a constitutional or absolute one; a government resting solidly on the basis of the sovereignty of the States, or on the unrestrained will of a majority; a form of government, as in all other unlimited ones, in which injustice, violence, and force must ultimately prevail."
Calhoun's fear, as well as that of Thomas Jefferson, was Washington's usurpation of powers constitutionally held by the people and the states, typically referred to as consolidation in their day.
A significant bone of contention were tariffs enacted to protect northern manufacturing interests. Referring to those tariffs, Calhoun said, "The North has adopted a system of revenue and disbursements, in which an undue proportion of the burden of taxation has been imposed on the South, and an undue proportion of its proceeds appropriated to the North."
The fact of the matter was that the South exported a large percentage of its output, mainly agricultural products; therefore, import duties on foreign products extracted far more from the South than the North.
Southerners complained of having to pay either high prices for northern-made goods or high tariffs on foreign-made goods. They complained about federal laws not that dissimilar to Navigation Acts that angered the Founders and contributed to the 1776 war for independence.
Speaking before the Georgia legislature, in November 1860, Senator Robert Toombs said, "They demanded a monopoly of the business of shipbuilding, and got a prohibition against the sale of foreign ships to the citizens of the United States. They demanded a monopoly of the coasting trade, in order to get higher freight prices than they could get in open competition with the carriers of the world. And now, today, if a foreign vessel in Savannah offers to take your rice, cotton, grain or lumber to New York, or any other American port, for nothing, your laws prohibit it, in order that Northern ship-owners may get enhanced prices for doing your carrying."
A precursor for the War Between the States came in 1832. South Carolina called a convention to nullify new tariff acts of 1828 and 1832 they referred to as "the tariffs of abomination."
The duties were multiples of previous duties and the convention declared them unconstitutional and authorized the governor to resist federal government efforts to enforce and collect them. After reaching the brink of armed conflict with Washington, a settlement calling for a stepped reduction in tariffs was reached - called the Great Compromise of 1833.
South Carolinians believed there was precedence for the nullification of unconstitutional federal laws. Both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison suggested the doctrine in 1798. The nullification doctrine was used to nullify federal laws in Georgia, Alabama, Pennsylvania and New England States. The reasoning was that the federal government was created by, and hence the agent of, the states.
When Congress enacted the Morrill Act (1861), raising tariffs to unprecedented levels, the South Carolina convention unanimously adopted and Ordinance of Secession declaring, "We assert that fourteen of the States have deliberately refused for years past to fulfill their constitutional obligations. Thus the constitutional compact has been deliberately broken and disregarded by the nonslaveholding States; and the consequence follows is that South Carolina is released from her obligation."
Continuing, the Ordinance declared, "We, therefore, the people of South Carolina, by our delegates in Convention assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, have solemnly declared that the Union heretofore existing between this State and the other States of North America is dissolved and that the State of South Carolina has resumed her position among the nations of the world, as a separate and independent State, with the full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce and to do other things which independent States may of right do."
Next year war started when South Carolinians fired on Fort Sumter, an island in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina.
The principle-agent relationship between the states and federal government was not an idea invented by South Carolina in 1861; it was a relation taken for granted.
At Virginia's convention to ratify the U.S. Constitution, the delegates said, "We delegates of the people of Virginia, . . . do in the name and on the behalf of the people of Virginia, declare and make known, that the powers granted under the Constitution being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed by them whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, and that every power not granted thereby remains with them, and at their will. That therefore no right, of any denomination, can be canceled, abridged, restrained or modified by the Congress, by the Senate, or House of Representatives, acting in any capacity, by the President, or any department or officer of the United States, except in those instances where power is given by the Constitution for those purposes."
The clear and key message was: the powers granted the federal government, by the people of Virginia, "may be resumed by them whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression" and every power not granted to the federal government by the Constitution resides with the people of Virginia.
The people of Virginia, through their delegates, set up a contractual agreement, along with the several sovereign states (emerging out of the 1783 Treaty of Paris ending the war with Great Britain), created the federal government as their agent. They enumerated the powers their agent shall have. When the federal government violates their grant of power, then the people of Virginia have the right to take back the power they granted the federal government, in other words, fire their agent.
The War Between the States, having settled the issue of secession, means the federal government can do anything it wishes and the states have little or no recourse. A derelict U.S. Supreme Court refuses to do its duty of interpreting both the letter and spirit of the Constitution. That has translated into the 70,000 federal regulations and mandates that controls the lives of our citizens. It also translates into interpretation of the "commerce" and "welfare" clauses of our Constitution in ways the Framers could not have possibly envisioned.
Today, it is difficult to think of one elected official with the statesman foresight of a Jefferson, Madison or Calhoun who can articulate the dangers to liberty presented by a run amuck federal government. Because of that, prospects for liberty appear dim. The supreme tragedy is that if liberty dies in America it is destined to die everywhere.
Walter E. Williams, Department of Economics, George Mason University
After Mr. Lincoln's war, Mr. Jefferson Davis was arrested and placed in prison prior to a trial. The trial was never held, because the chief justice of the supreme court Mr. Salmon Portland Chase: informed President Andrew Johnson that if Mr. Davis is placed on trial for treason the case will be decided thus. Justice Chase informed the President that the U.S. Government would LOSE the case because nothing in the constitution forbids secession. That is why no trial of Jefferson Davis was held, despite the fact he wanted one. Reserved powers totally kills the idea of secession is unconstitutional.
Col. John B. Baldwin's Sworn Testimony Regarding His Interview With Abraham Lincoln on 4 April 1861
Washington, D.C., February 10, 1866
John B. Baldwin sworn and examined by Mr. Howard:
Question. You are now speaker of the Virginia house of
delegates?
Answer. I am.
Question. Are you a native of
Virginia?
Answer. I am.
Question. Have you resided in
Virginia during the war?
Answer. Yes, sir; I have resided
all my life in Staunton, Augusta county.
Question. I think you were an
original Union man?
Answer. I was; the most
thorough-going I ever knew.
Question. Were you a member of the
so-called secession convention in Virginia?
Answer. I was.
Question. Did you attend all its
sittings?
Answer. I did.
Question. Open as well as secret?
Answer. I did attend its sessions,
except after the ordinance of secession had passed; I was withdrawn by other duties a good
deal from the session; but I was kept advised, and aware substantially of all that passed.
Question. Did you sign that
ordinance?
Answer. I did.
Question. Can you tell what has
become of it, or where it is now deposited?
Answer. I have understood that it
is in the city of Washington, in the possession of government, having been taken when the
Union troops entered Richmond.
Question. Did you make a journey
to Washington before the firing on Fort Sumter?
Answer. I did. I came here on the
night of the 3d of April, 1861; I was here on the 4th day of April, 1861.
Question. Did you have an
interview with President Lincoln?
Answer. I did have a private
interview with him, lasting perhaps an hour.
Question. Do you feel at liberty
to state what transpired at that interview?
Answer. I do sir; I know of no
reason why I should not.
Question. Have the goodness to
state it.
Answer. On the 3d of April, 1861,
I was in the convention. I was called out by Judge Summers, a member of the convention,
who informed me that there was a messenger in Richmond, sent by Mr. Seward, asking him
(Summers) to come to Washington, as the President wanted to have an interview with him,
and stating that if for any reason he was unable to come, he would be glad if the Union
men of the convention would select and send on some communication with them. Mr. Summers
told me that he and a number of other members of the convention, Union men (calling their
names over), had concurred in the opinion that I was the proper man to go, and that he
wanted me immediately to get ready and return with the special messenger. I consented to
come. A Mr. Allen B. Magruder, who was at that time a lawyer in the city of Washington,
turned out to be the messenger. We came to Washington, and arrived here about breakfast
time. I went to Mr. Magruder’s house. About 10 or 11 o’clock we called at the
Department of State, and I was introduced to Mr. Seward. Mr. Magruder informed him that I
was the gentleman selected by the members of the Virginia convention — the Union men
— in accordance with his request, and that I came indorsed by them as a person
authorized to speak their sentiments. Mr. Seward said he would not anticipate at all what
the President desired to say to me, but would take me immediately to his house. We went to
the President’s house, and I was taken to the audience chamber. The President was
engaged for some time; and at last Mr. Seward, when the President became disengaged, took
me up and introduced me to him in a whisper, indicating, as I thought, that it was a
perfectly confidential affair. As nearly as I can recollect, the language he used was,
“Mr. Baldwin, of the Virginia convention.” Mr. Lincoln received me very
cordially, and almost immediately arose and said that he desired to have some private
conversation with me; he started through into the back room, opening into the other room;
but on getting in there, we found two gentlemen sitting there engaged in writing, and he
seemed to think that that would not do, and passed across the hall into a corresponding
small room opposite, and through that into a large front room — immediately
corresponding with the private audience hall — in which there was a bed; he locked
the door, and stepping around into a space behind the bed, drew up two chairs, and asked
me to take a seat. Mr. Seward did not go in with us.
As I was about sitting down, said he,
“Mr. Baldwin, I am afraid you have come too late.”
“Too late for what?” said I.
“Said he, “I am afraid you have
come too late; I wish you could have been here three or four days ago.”
“Why,” said I, “Mr.
President, allow me to say I do not understand your remark; you sent a special messenger
to Richmond— ”
Question. You got the request to
Mr. Summers on the 3d of April?
Answer. Yes, sir.
Question. And you started—
Answer. Within three hours.
Question. And you arrived on the
morning of the 4th?
Answer. Yes; and my interview with
Mr. Lincoln was about 11 o’clock that day. Said I, “I do not understand you; you
sent a special messenger to Richmond, who arrived there yesterday; I returned with him by
the shortest and most expeditious mode of travel known; it was physically impossible that
I or any one else, answering to your summons, could have got here sooner than I have
arrived; I do not understand what you mean by saying that I have come too late.”
Said he, “Why do you not all adjourn
the Virginia convention?
Said I, “Adjourn it! How? Do you
mean sine die?”
“Yes,” said he, “sine
die; why do you not adjourn it; it is a standing menace to me, which embarrasses me
very much.”
Of course you will understand that I do
not pretend to recollect the language at all, but this is about the substance of it. Said
I, “Sir, I am very much surprised to hear you express that opinion; the Virginia
convention is in the hands of Union men; we have in it a clear and controlling majority of
nearly three to one; we are controlling it for conservative results; we can do it with
perfect certainty, if you will uphold our hands by a conservative policy here. I do not
understand why you want a body thus in the hands of Union men to be dispersed, or why you
should look upon their sessions as in any respect a menace to you; we regard ourselves as
co-operating with you in the objects which you express to seek; besides,” said I,
“I would call your attention to this view: If we were to adjourn that convention sine
die, leaving these question unsettled in the midst of all the trouble that is on us,
it would place the Union men of Virginia in the attitude of confessing an inability to
meet the occasion; the result would be, that another convention would be called as soon as
legislation could be put through for the purpose.
Question. Was the legislature of
Virginia then in session in the same city, Richmond?
Answer. Yes, sir; that is my
impression. Said I, “As soon as the necessary legislation can be gotten through,
another convention would be called, and the Union men of Virginia could not, with a proper
self-respect, offer themselves as members of that convention, having had the full control
of one, and having adjourned without having brought about any sort of settlement of the
troubles upon us. The result would be that the next convention would be exclusively under
the control of secessionists, and that an ordinance of secession would be passed in less
than six weeks.
“Now,” said I, “Sir, it
seems to me that our true policy is to hold the position that we have, and for you to
uphold our hands by a conservative, conciliatory, national course. We can control the
matter, and will control it if you help us. And, sir, it is but right for me to say
another thing to you, that the Union men of Virginia, of whom I am one, would not be
willing to adjourn that convention until we either effect some settlement of this matter
or ascertain that it cannot be done. As an original proposition, the Union men of Virginia
did not desire amendments to the Constitution of the United States; we were
perfectly satisfied with the constitutional guarantees that we had, and thought our rights
and interests perfectly safe. But circumstances have changed; seven States of the south,
the cotton States, have withdrawn from us and have left us in an extremely altered
condition in reference to the safe-guards of the Constitution. As things stand now,
we are helpless in the hands of the north. The balance of power which we had before for
our protection against constitutional amendment is gone. And we think now that we of the
border States who have adhered to you against all the obligations of association and
sympathy with the southern States have a claim on the States of the north which is of a
high and very peculiar character. You all say that you do not mean to injure us in our
peculiar rights. If you are in earnest about it there can be no objection to your saying
so in such an authentic form as will give us the force of constitutional protection. And
we think you ought to do it, not grudgingly, not reluctantly, but in such a way as that it
would be a fitting recognition of our fidelity in standing by you under all circumstances
— fully, and generously, and promptly. If you will do it in accordance with what we
regard as due to our position, it will give us a stand-point from which we can bring back
the seceded States.”
I cannot follow the conversation through;
but he asked me the question, “What is your plan?”
Said I, “Mr. President, if I had the
control of your thumb and forefinger five minutes I could settle the whole question.”
“Well,” said he, “that
would seem to be a simple process.”
Said I, “I can settle it as surely
as that there is a God in heaven, if you just give me the control of your thumb and
forefinger for five minutes. To let you understand how earnestly I believe it, as God is
my judge, if I could get the control of that thumb and forefinger for five minutes, I
would be willing, unless my weak flesh would fail me, that you should take me out within
the next five minutes and knock me on the head on Pennsylvania avenue.”
“Well,” said he, “what is
your plan?”
Said I, “Sir, if I were in your
place I would issue a proclamation to the American people, somewhat after this style: I
would state the fact that you had become President of the United States as the result of a
partisan struggle partaking of more bitterness than had usually marked such struggle;
that, in the progress of that struggle, there had naturally arisen a great deal of
misunderstanding and misrepresentation of the motives and intentions of both sides; that
you had no doubt you had been represented, and to a large extent believed, to be inimical
to the institutions and interests and rights of a large portion of the United States, but
that, however, you might, in the midst of a partisan struggle, have been more or less (as
all men) excited at times, occupying the position of President of the United States, you
had determined to take your stand on the broad platform of the general Constitution,
and to do equal and exact justice to all, without regard to party or section; and that,
recognizing the fact without admitting the right, but protesting against the right, that
seven States had undertaken to withdraw themselves from the Union, you had determined to
appeal to the American people to settle the question in the spirit in which the Constitution
was made — American fashion — by consulting the people of the United States and
urge upon them to come together and settle this thing. And in order to prevent the
possibility of any collision or clash of arms interfering with this effort at a pacific
settlement, I would declare the purpose (not in any admission of want of right at all, but
with a distinct protest of the right, to place the forces of the United States wherever in
her territory you choose) to withdraw the forces from Sumter and Pickens, declaring that
it was done for the sake of peace, in effort to settle this thing; and that you were
determined, if the seceded States chose to make a collision, that they should come clear
out of their way and do it.
“Sir,” said I, “if you
take that position there is national feeling enough in the seceded States themselves and
all over the country to rally to your support, and you would gather more friends than any
man in the country has ever had.”
He said something or other, I do not
recollect what, but it created the impression upon me that he was looking with some
apprehension to the idea that his friends would not be pleased with such a step, and I
said to him, “Mr. President, for every one of your friends whom you would lose by
such a policy you would gain ten who would rally to you and to the national standard of
peace and Union.”
Said he rather impatiently, “That is
not what I am thinking about. If I could be satisfied that I am right, and that I do what
is right, I do not care whether people stand by me or not.”
Said I, “Sir, I beg your pardon, for
I only know of you as a politician, a successful politician; and possibly I have fallen
into the error of addressing you by the motives which are generally potent with
politicians, the motive of gaining friends. I thank you that you have recalled to me the
higher and better motive of being right; and I assure you that, from now on, I will
address you only by the motives that ought to influence a gentleman.”
Question. You drew a distinction
between a politician and a gentleman?
Answer. Yes, sir; he laughed a
little at that. He said something about the withdrawal of the troops from Sumter on the
ground of military necessity.
Said I, “That will never do, under
heaven. You have been President a month to-day, and if you intended to hold that position
you ought to have strengthened it, so as to make it impregnable. To hold it in the present
condition of force there is an invitation to assault. Go upon higher ground than that. The
better ground than that is to make a concession of an asserted right in the interest of
peace.”
“Well,” said he, “what
about the revenue? What would I do about the collection of duties?”
Said I, “Sir, how much do you expect
to collect in a year?”
Said he, “Fifty or sixty
millions.”
“Why, sir,” said I, “four
times sixty is two hundred and forty. Say $250,000,000 would be the revenue of your term
of the presidency; what is that but a drop in the bucket compared with the cost of such a
war as we are threatened with? Let it all go, if necessary; but I do not believe that it
will be necessary, because I believe that you can settle it on the basis I suggest.”
He said something or other about feeding
the troops at Sumter. I told him that would not do. Said I, “You know perfectly well
that the people of Charleston have been feeding them already. That is not what they are
at. They are asserting a right. They will feed the troops, and fight them while they are
feeding them. They are after the assertion of a right. Now, the only way that you can
manage them is to withdraw from the means of making a blow until time for reflection, time
for influence which can be brought to bear, can be gained, and settle the matter. If you
do not take this course, if there is a gun fired at Sumter -- I do not care on which side
it is fired -- the thing is gone.”
“Oh,” said he, “sir, that
is impossible.”
Said I, “Sir, if there is a gun
fired at Fort Sumter, as sure as there is a God in heaven the thing is gone. Virginia
herself, strong as the Union majority in the convention is now, will be out in forty-eight
hours.”
“Oh,” said he, “sir, that
is impossible.”
Said I, “Mr. President, I did not
come here to argue with you; I am here as a witness. I know the sentiments of the people
of Virginia, and you do not. I understand that I was to come here to give you information
of the sentiments of the people, and especially of the sentiments of the Union men of the
convention. I wish to know before we go any further in this matter, for it is of too grave
importance to have any doubt of it, whether I am accredited to you in such a way as that
what I tell you is worthy of credence.”
Said he, “You come to me introduced
as a gentleman of high standing and talent in your State.”
Said I, “That is not the point I am
on. Do I come to you vouched for as an honest man, who will tell you the truth?”
Said he, “You do.”
“Then,” said I, “sir, I
tell you, before God and man, that if there is a gun fired at Sumter this thing is gone.
And I wish to say to you, Mr. President, with all the solemnity that I can possibly
summon, that if you intend to do anything to settle this matter you must do it promptly. I
think another fortnight will be too late. You have the power now to settle it. You have
the choice to make, and you have got to make it very soon. You have, I believe, the power
to place yourself up by the side of Washington himself, as the savior of your country, or,
by taking a different course of policy, to send down your name on the page of history
notorious forever as a man so odious to the American people that, rather than submit to
his domination, they would overthrow the best government that God ever allowed to exist.
You have the choice to make, and you have, in my judgment, no more than a fortnight to
make it in.”
That is about as much as I can gather out
of the conversation now. I went to Alexandria that night, where I had telegraphed an
acceptance of an invitation to make a Union speech, and made a speech to a large audience,
which, I believe, was the last Union speech made in Virginia before the war; and I went
onto to Richmond and reported to these gentlemen.
Question. You received from Mr.
Lincoln no letter or memorandum in writing?
Answer. Nothing whatever.
Question. No pledge? No
undertaking?
Answer. No pledge, no undertaking;
no offer; no promise of any sort. I went back to Mr. Seward’s from the
President’s house that afternoon and had a long talk with him. I found Mr. Seward
extremely earnest, as far as mortal man could judge from his manifestations, in the desire
to settle the matter. He seemed to have a shrinking from the idea of a clash of arms, and
the impression that he made upon me was, that he thought the days of philosophic
statesmanship about to give way to the mailed glove of the warrior, and that he was
earnestly engaged in the effort to secure peace and union, as the means of averting the
military era which he thought he saw dawning upon the country. I had a good deal of
interesting conversation with him that evening. I was about to state that I have reason to
believe that Mr. Lincoln himself has given an account of this conversation, which has been
understood — but, I am sure, misunderstood — by the persons to whom he talked,
as giving the representation of it that he had offered to me, that if the Virginia
convention would adjourn sine die he would withdraw the troops from Sumter and
Pickens. I am as clear in my recollection as it is possible to be under the circumstances
that he made no such suggestion, as I understood it, and said nothing from which I could
infer it, for I was so earnest and so excited — the matter involving what I thought
would give a promise of settlement to the contrary — that I am sure no opening of
that sort (although I would not have thought it a practicable scheme), no overture of any
sort could have escaped me. I am sure that I would have made it the foundation, if not of
direct negotiation, at least of temporizing, in connexion with others. But I have reason
to believe that persons have derived that impression from conversation with Mr. Lincoln.
Whether Mr. Lincoln intended to convey that impression to them or not, of course I have no
means of judging.
Question. Did Mr. Seward send by
you any letter or memorandum in writing?
Answer. None whatever -- no letter
or memorandum in writing, nor any message to anybody, except his respects and compliments
to Judge Summers.
Question. One object of your visit
to the President was to obtain from him some assurance that he would take some step in the
interest of peace, or to prevent a collision of arms?
Answer. No, sir. That was one of
the objects of the interview; but my visit there was at the instance of the President
himself, who, without at all indicating the purpose of conference, expressed a desire to
have a conference with some gentleman who would be a recognized exponent of the Union
sentiment in the Virginia convention.
Question. You entertained the
hope, at that interview, of getting from him some assurance, some encouragement, by which
the collision of arms might be prevented?
Answer. That was my object and
purpose earnestly.
Question. Was it not your main
object and purpose?
Answer. It was the only object
that I had. The object I had in going on was to meet what I regarded, and what our friends
in the convention regarded, as an overture to what we had long desired — an
understanding with Mr. Lincoln. We thought that if we could get into communication with
him, and could convey to him a clear and honest exposition of the sentiments prevailing in
Virginia, we could influence his policy in such a way as to enable us to bring about a
settlement of the affair. At the time I was here I saw, and was introduced to, in the
President’s room, a number of governors of States. It was at the time the nine
governors had the talk here with the President — the time when there was an immense
outside pressure brought to bear upon the President. We thought in Virginia that if we
could only present fairly to the mind of Mr. Lincoln the necessities of our situation, the
difficulties with which we were surrounded, and the prospect of success on the line of
policy which we could suggest, that we could accomplish something towards settling the
question. I came on to Washington, not with any defined purpose at all, but with the
general purpose of trying to establish a good understanding with him, and inducing him, as
far as possible, to take the views which universally prevailed among Union men in the
Richmond convention.